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Abstract
Adaptive learning and eductive learning are two widely used ways of mod-
eling learning behavior in macroeconomics. Both approaches yield restrictions
on model parameters under which agents are able to learn a rational expec-
tation equilibrium (REE) but these restrictions do not always overlap with
one another. In this paper we report on an experiment where we exploit such
differences in stability conditions under adaptive and eductive learning to in-
vestigate which learning approach provides a better description of the learning
behavior of human subjects. Our results suggest that adaptive learning is a bet-
ter predictor of whether a system converges to REE, while the path by which
the system converges appears to be a mixture of both adaptive and eductive
learning model predictions.
JEL Classification: C91, C92, D83, D84
Keywords: Rational Expectations, Adaptive Learning, Eductive Learning,
Experimental Economics.
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1 Introduction
How do agents learn a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) if they do not initially
find themselves in such an equilibrium? This important, foundational question has
generated a large literature in macroeconomics (see, e.g., surveys by Sargent (1993),
Grandmont (1998), Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). In this paper we focus on two
different but related approaches to addressing this question.
Perhaps the most widely used approach to modeling learning behavior (beginning,
e.g., with Bray (1982)) is to suppose that agents are boundedly rational adaptive
learners and to ask whether their use of a given real-time adaptive learning model
that allows for a REE as a possible solution converges in the limit to that REE.
An alternative, off-line approach advocated, e.g., by Guesnerie (1992, 2002), is to
suppose that learning is a mental process involving (possibly collective) introspection
that takes place in some notional time and that leads agents to understand and
instantly coordinate upon or “educe” the REE solution.1 Both approaches to learning
place restrictions on the model under which learning agents are able to learn the
REE using either the adaptive or eductive approaches. Our aim here is to test the
validity of these restrictions for the “learnability” of REE using controlled laboratory
experiments. Further, in model parameterizations where both approaches predict that
the REE is stable under learning (“learnable”) the two approach nevertheless predict
different speeds of convergence by which agents should be able to learn the REE. If
agents are adaptive learners it should take more than a single period for their price
forecasts to converge to the REE value. By contrast, if agents are eductive learners
and understand the model, their price forecasts should instantaneously convergence
to the REE value.
Evans (2001) highlights the different restrictions of the two different approaches
to learning, and invites empirical and experimental testing of the different theoretical
predictions. Specifically he writes:
“Which is the appropriate way to model economic agents will ultimately
be a matter for empirical and experimental research. It is likely that
the answer depends on the circumstances, for example, in experiments,
1These two approaches are also considered as two broad classes for belief formation in a recent
survey of expectations in macroeconomics by Woodford (2013).
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on the details of the setting and the types of information provided to
the subjects. A plausible conjecture is that when a model is simple and
transparent as well as eductively stable, agents will coordinate rapidly on
the REE....If a model has no eductively stable REE, but has an REE
that is adaptively stable, then a plausible conjecture is that there will still
be convergence to the REE, at a rate governed by the accumulation of
data....The eductive results provide a caution, however, that coordination
in such cases may not be robust.” (Evans 2001, p. 581 emphasis added).
In this paper we follow up on Evans’s invitation to compare adaptive versus eductive
learning approaches. Indeed, the manner in which agents might go about learning
a rational expectations equilibrium is an important, but unresolved issue; there are
many ways to model this learning process and it would be useful to have a consen-
sus on which approach (or combination of approaches) are more empirically valid
than others.2 Understanding the manner in which agents learn is also important for
policy purposes. For instance, if agents can educe REE prior to making decisions
via the mental, collective introspective process described by eductive learning, then
policy ineffectiveness propositions that arise under rational expectations may have
full standing. However, if agents learn REE only adaptively in real-time, then policy
interventions are likely to be effective in the short-run in the determination of eco-
nomic variables. Thus, the manner in which agents learn is an important empirical
question.
Ideally, one would like to address the question of how agents form expectations
using non-experimental field data, but unfortunately, properly incentivized field data
on individual-level expectations are not generally available. Survey evidence, e.g., on
inflationary expectations, consumer confidence, etc. are available, but these data are
not properly incentivized in that constant rewards or, more typically, no reward at
all for participation in such surveys, yield poor incentives to report truthful beliefs.
Even setting such incentive problems aside, to use survey data on expectations one
would have to know precise properties of the model or data generating process in
which agents were forming their expectations, knowledge that is typically unavailable
and/or subject to some dispute. For these reasons, a laboratory experiment offers the
better means of collecting data on expectations as truthful revelation can be properly
2Here we focus on just two approaches, but there are several other approaches including Bayesian
learning, evolutionary learning and near-rational (calculation-cost) learning.
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incentivized (using quadratic loss scoring rules) and the control of the laboratory
allows for precise implementation of the model environment (data generating process)
in which agents’ expectations matter for the realizations of economic variables.
The organization of the remainder of paper is as follows: section 2 discusses
related literature, section 3 presents the theoretical model, section 4 discusses the
experimental design and hypotheses, section 5 reports the experimental results, and
section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In terms of experimental design, our work is related to “learning–to–forecast” exper-
iments (as pioneered by Marimon and Sunder (1993)), that involve versions of the
cobweb market model with negative feedback (or strategic substitutes). Hommes et
al. (2000) provides the first experimental test of such a cobweb economy, and this
study has been followed by Sonnemans et al. (2004), Hommes et al. (2007), Heemeijer
et al. (2009), Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2010), Bao et al. (2012, 2013) and Beshears
et al. (2013). Hommes (2011) surveys the literature. The differences between the
present study and those earlier papers are as follows. First, subjects in all of these
prior studies do not precisely know the model of the economy (data generating pro-
cess) which makes it impossible for them to apply eductive learning as that type of
learning (as demonstrated below) requires full knowledge of the model thereby en-
abling introspective reasoning about the proper forecast. By contrast, subjects in
our experiment are informed about the model economy and so they can in principle
apply eductive learning, or even directly solve for the REE using the perfect foresight
condition. Second, all prior experiments using the cobweb model employ a group
design, where both learning and strategic uncertainty can influence the speed of the
convergence to the REE. By contrast, we have both a group (“oligopoly market”)
treatment and an individual-decision making (“monopoly” market) treatment where
subjects face a situation that more closely approximates the theoretical model as it
rules out strategic uncertainty as a factor that may influence the results. Third, all
prior learning–to–forecast experiments involving the cobweb model use a data gener-
ating process for the market price equation that has a coefficient on expected prices,
α, that is smaller than 1 in absolute value. To our knowledge, our experiment is the
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first one where a coefficient of |α| > 1 is used. Finally, we explicitly test restrictions
on the stability of REE under two different learning approaches. By contrast, most
of the existing experimental literature on whether and how agents learn a REE in
cobweb economies has been concerned with characterizing the type distribution of
(adaptive) learning behaviors without regard to any stability under learning criteria,
and certainly not a comparison of different learning criteria, as we present in this
paper.
Since subjects in our experiment know how the price is determined as a function
of price forecasts, (i.e., they know the data generating process) our experiment is
also related to an experimental literature on “guessing” or “beauty contest” games,
see, e.g., Nagel (1995), Duffy and Nagel (1997), Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) among
others). In these guessing games, subjects are asked to guess a number. The winning
guess, (which is similar to a market price and which yields the winner a large prize),
is a known function of the average guess (or average opinion which is similar to the
mean price forecast). A main finding from this literature is that the winning number
is initially very far from the rational expectations equilibrium though it gets closer
to that prediction with experience. Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) report that, under
complete information feedback, convergence to the equilibrium is faster when the size
of the population is smaller. In our experiment we consider forecasting by a group
of three subjects (in our “oligopoly” setting) as well as an individual forecasting
treatment (our “monopoly” setting) and we also examine whether our results for
the monopoly treatment are closer to the REE relative to the oligopoly treatment.
The winning number in beauty contest games is typically a linear function, ρ × the
mean guess, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) which is similar to a learning–to–forecast experiment
with positive feedback (strategic complements). There are also some guessing game
experiments where ρ ∈ (−1, 0) such as Sutan and Willinger (2009). The difference
between our work and their paper is that we provide a more detailed description of
the model that generates the price that agents are seeking to forecast and we vary the
value of ρ (equivalently, our α) so as to explore the implications of differing stability
results under the adaptive and eductive approaches to learning. As in a typical
macroeconomic model, we also add a shock term in the price determination equation,
a setup that is not typically found in number guessing games. Our framework can also
be extended easily to a real intertemporal design where shocks are autocorrelated.
Finally, since we have both a monopoly (individual decision-making) and oligopoly
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(group decision-making) design, our paper is related to experimental studies on
oligopoly markets, for example, Bosch-Dome´nech and Vriend (2003), Huck et al.
(1999), and Offerman et al. (2002). These oligopoly market experiments use learning–
to–optimize designs where subjects submit a quantity choice directly and price fore-
casts are not elicited. By contrast, we ignore quantity choices and focus on price
forecasts using a learning-to-forecast design.3 Our monopoly vs. oligopoly design
is helpful in investigating the role of common knowledge of rationality. This relates
our paper to experimental studies on the role common knowledge of rationality in
different market settings, for example, the “money illusion” experiments by Fehr and




We consider a simple version of a cobweb model as presented in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) that is based on Bray and Savin (1986). This cobweb model was originally
used by Muth (1961) to illustrate the notion of a REE. The model has the advantage
that it is simple enough to explain to subjects and has the critical feature that ex-
pectations matter for outcomes, here price realizations, while outcomes can in turn
matter for beliefs as subjects interact under the same model environment repeatedly.
The cobweb model is one of demand and supply for a single perishable good and
consists of the two equations:




Here, D represents demand, S supply, a, b, and c are parameters, which are usually
assumed to be positive, pt is the period t price of the good, p
e
t = Et−1[pt], and ηt is a
3In a learning-to-forecast design, subjects submit a price forecast and a computer program uses
that forecast to optimally determine the subject’s quantity decision. By contrast, in a learning–
to–optimize design, subjects submit a quantity choice directly; their price forecast is not elicited,
though it is implicit in their quantity decision. See Bao et al. (2013) for a comparison of these two
approaches.
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mean zero supply shock.4
Assuming market clearing, the reduced form equation for prices is given by:
pt = µ+ αp
e
t + νt, (1)
where µ = a
b
, α = − c
b









As Evans (2001) shows, the unique REE of this model is stable under adaptive learning
(i.e., it is “learnable”) if α < 1. However, under the eductive learning approach, the
REE is learnable only if |α| < 1 (See, e.g. Evans (2001) or Evans and Honkapohja
(2001, section 15.4). 5
To be more precise, adaptive learning consists of a general class of backward
looking learning rules that make use of past information and the specific type of
adaptive learning rule that we consider in this paper is “least squares learning.” In
assuming that agents learn in this adaptive fashion, we suppose that they do not
know or they ignore any information about the price determination equations of the
economy. Instead, they start out by choosing a random prediction for the price in
period 1, pe1. Adaptive agents’ “perceived law of motion” for the price at time t is
that it is equal to some constant, a, plus noise, , i.e., pet = a + , which has the
same functional form as the REE solution. Given this perceived law of motion and
the assumption that agents are least squares learners, it follows that, in each period
4Bray and Savin and Evans and Honkapohja use a somewhat richer model in which the supply
equation, St = cp
e
t + δwt−1 + ηt, where wt−1 is an observable exogenous variable affecting supply,
e.g., weather in period t − 1, that follows a know process (i.i.d. mean 0 or possibly AR(1)). For
simplicity we study the case where δ = 0, but we think it would also be interesting to study cases
with such exogenous forcing variables as well.
5We understand that other learning approaches may impose different restrictions on the param-
eters for the cobweb economy to converge to the REE. For example, Hommes and Wagener (2010)
find when the agents are users of the evolutionary learning model as in Brock and Hommes (1997),
the market price may converge to a locally stable two cycle when α ∈ [ 12 , 1].
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Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a proof, based on matrix operations, as to
why the REE in this simple cobweb system is learnable via adaptive, least squares
learning provided that α < 1. In this section we provide an alternative and more
intuitive proof based on mathematical induction.
Without loss of generality, let pe1 = p
∗ + ∆, where ∆ is the difference between
the period 1 prediction and the REE. Substituting this forecast into equation (1)
and for simplicity, ignoring νt in the proof because it has zero mean, we obtain
p1 = µ + α(p
∗ + ∆). Since p∗ = µ + αp∗, this expression simplifies to p1 = p∗ + α∆.
In period 2: the prediction is the price in period 1, pe2 = p1 = p
∗ + α∆. Substituting
this prediction into equation (1) and simplifying, p2 = µ + αp
e
2 = p
∗ + α2∆. In






α(α+1)∆. Substituting this prediction into equation (1) and simplifying yields





α2(α + 1)∆. By iterating in this fashion it is not difficult




s=1 ps = p
∗ + α(α+1)(α+2)...(α+t−2)
1×2×3...(t−1) ∆ and so





Clearly this system converges to the REE when the ratio α(α+1)(α+2)...(α+t−2)
1×2×3...(t−1) goes to
0. This ratio consists of t−1 components in both the numerator and the denominator.
We can pair the components in the numerator and the denominator according to the
sequence, namely, let α be paired to 1, α+ 1 paired to 2, ..., α+ t− 2 paired to t− 1.
When α > 1, each component of the numerator is larger than its paired number in the
denominator. Therefore α(α+1)(α+2)...(α+t−2)
1×2×3...(t−1) will increase over time with t, diverging
away from 0. When α = 1, the ratio is exactly equal to 1. When −1 < α < 1, each
component in the numerator has a smaller absolute value than its paired number, so
the ratio will decrease with t, and goes to 0 as t→∞.
When α < −1, we make a slightly different re-matching of the components in the
numerator and the denominator. First, let m be an integer such that α+m− 1 < 0
and α+m > 0. We re-state the ratio as α(α+1)(α+2)...(α+m−1)(α+m)(α+m+1)...(α+t−2)
1×2×3...(t−m−1)(t−m)(t−m+1)...(t−1) . We
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then “cut” the numerator into two parts, N1 = α(α + 1)(α + 2)...(α + m − 1) and
N2 = (α+m)(α+m+1)...(α+t−2), and we also cut the denominator into two parts,
D1 = 1× 2× 3...(t−m− 1) and D2 = (t−m)(t−m+ 1)...(t− 1). We pair N2 to D1,
namely, α+m to 1, α+m+ 1 to 2, ... α+ t− 2 to t−m− 1. It is not difficult to see
that each item in N2 is smaller than the paired item in D1 (α+m < 1, α+m+1 < 2,
... α+ t− 2 < t−m− 1), and therefore (α+m)(α+m+1)(α+m+2)...(α+t−2)
1×2×3...(t−m−1) decreases with t,
and goes to 0 as t → ∞. There remain m extra components in both the numerator
and the denominator. In the numerator, |N1| = |α(α+1)(α+2)...(α+m−1)| < |αm|
is a finite number, while in the denominator, D2 = (t−m)(t + m + 1)...(t− 1) goes
to infinity as t→∞. Therefore, the remaining fraction α(α+1)(α+2)...(α+m−1)
(t−m)(t−m+1)...(t−1) also goes
to 0 as t → ∞. It follows that, under adaptive (least squares) learning, the system
converges to the REE provided that α < 1 and diverges from the REE only if α > 1.
For the experiment we parameterized the cobweb model as follows: µ = 60 and
νt ∼ N(0, 1). We consider three different values for α which comprise our three
treatment values (T) for this variable: T1: α = −0.5, T2: α = −0.9 and T3: α = −2.
The REE associated with these three choices are p∗ = 40, p∗ = 31.58 and p∗ = 20,
respectively.
To illustrate the theoretical predictions for adaptive learning using the parame-
terization of our experiment, we simulate the market price for the case where agents
use the adaptive learning model starting from an initial guess of pe1 = 50, which is
rather far from the REE in all three α treatment cases. The simulated prices and the
REE for the three cases are shown in Figure 1. The simulation results reveal that all
markets converge to the REE within a small number of periods.
Figure 1: Simulated price for the cases where α = −0.5 (left panel), −0.9 (mid panel)
and −2 (right panel).
Eductive learning in this economy works in the following way: in notional period
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0, since agents know that pt = µ + αp
e
t , the price should be non-negative, and since
α = c
b
< 0, agents can logically rule out predictions that are greater than µ6; in
notional period 1, knowing that the price cannot be larger than µ, and substituting
this constraint into the price equation, pt = µ+αp
e
t , agents should not predict prices
lower than µ+αµ = (1 +α)µ; in notional period 2, using the same reasoning, agents
can rule out price predictions greater than µ+α(µ+αµ) = (1 +α+α2)µ, etc. More
generally, in notional period t, the new prediction boundary created by this iterative
process will be (1 + α + α2 + ... + αt)µ. If |α| < 1, this process will tighten the
interval range of possible predictions to a single point, the REE. When |α| < 1, in the




1−α . This iterative,
notional time eductive learning process is illustrated in Figure 2. On the other hand,
when α < −1, the agents cannot rule out any numbers starting from notional period
1, because µ+ αµ < 0.
 
0B    1
(1 )B      
0   
2
2 (1 )B        
2 3
3 (1 )B          
2 3 4










The Iterative Process of Eductive Learning in Notional Periods 
Figure 2: An illustration of the iterative process in notional time under eductive
learning. The process creates a boundary, Bt, in notional time period t, and excludes
numbers that are larger/smaller than this boundary in even/odd notional periods.
When |α| < 1 the boundaries move closer to each other with each iteration so that





In our experiment we keep all parameterizations of the model constant across
treatments varying only the value of α, T1: α = −0.5, T2: α = −0.9 and T3:
α = −2. Both learning theories predict that subjects will learn the REE in treatments
T1 and T2, but under T3, the REE is stable under learning only if agents are adaptive
6Since the literature on eductive learning typically assumes that α < 0 as the starting point,
when we prove that the REE is not eductively stable when |α| > 1, we only focus on α < −1,
because α > 1 is already ruled out by the assumption that α < 0.
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learners; according to the educative learning approach, the REE should not be stable
under learning in T3 where |α| > 1. This is our main hypothesis to be tested. In
addition, we explore in our oligopoly treatment whether this prediction extends to the
case of heterogeneous expectations. Finally, we also consider differences in speeds of
convergence; when an REE is stable under eductive learning, convergence should, in
principle, be instantaneous while under adaptive learning, it can take several periods
for the economy to converge to a REE depending on initial price forecasts.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Treatments
We employ a 3 × 2 design where the treatment variables are (1) the three different
values of the slope coefficient, α, and (2) the number of subjects in one experi-
mental market: either just one subject–the “monopoly” case or three subjects–the
“oligopoly” case. The monopoly vs. oligopoly design is helpful in investigating the
role of common knowledge of rationality, as emphasized by Guesnerie (2003). In
monopoly markets, common knowledge of rationality is not an issue since the single
agent faces no uncertainty about his own level of rationality. By contrast, in oligopoly
markets agents may need to consider whether the other market participants are able
to form rational expectations; if not, then predicting the REE price may no longer
be a best response.
A noted earlier, our three treatment values for α are given by:
Treatment 1 (T1): weak negative feedback treatment, α = −0.5.
Treatment 2 (T2): medium level negative feedback treatment, α = −0.9.
Treatment 3 (T3): strong negative treatment, α = −2.
As shown in the prior section, the REE should be learnable under adaptive expec-
tations for all three values of α. Generally negative feedback systems converge much
faster than positive feedback systems (Heemeijer et al. 2009, Bao et al. 2012). The
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REE should be learnable under eductive learning only in treatments T1 and T2, but
not in T3.
Our experiment makes use of a learning to forecast (“LtFE”) experimental design.
Subjects play the role of an advisor who makes price forecasts. Subjects are paid
according to the accuracy of their own price forecast and so are incentivized to provide
good price forecasts. In the monopoly treatment, the time t price forecast of the one
subject, i, associated with each monopoly market, pei,t determines the price forecast
for that market, i.e., pet = p
e
i,t which is then used to determine the actual price, pt,
for that monopoly market according to equation (1). By contrast, in the oligopoly
treatment, we use the mean of the three subjects’ individual price forecasts for period






i,t, which is then used to determine
the actual price, pt, for each oligopoly market, again according to equation (1).
An important issue is how to allow for eductive learning. This is an off–line,
notional time concept so it is not so clear how to capture or measure this kind of
learning in real time. Here we focus on the stability differences as pointed out by
Evans (2001) as our main test of whether agents are eductive or adaptive learners.
Still, an important issue is whether subjects understand the model and have sufficient
time for introspection. Under adaptive learning, agents are not assumed to know
the model while under eductive learning they do know the model. What we have
chosen to do is to fully educate subjects about the model, in particular about the
price determination equation, (1) – see the written experimental instructions in the
Appendix for the details on how this information was presented to subjects. Thus the
agents in our model have more information than is typically assumed under adaptive
learning specifications, but at the same time, they have all the information they need
to be eductive learners. We felt that, in order to put the two learning approaches on an
equal footing for comparison purposes we would have to eliminate any informational
differences, which could serve as a confounding factor, and provide subjects with
complete and common information about the model across all of our six treatments.
Further, we note that we did not impose any time limits on subjects’ decision-making
so as not to limit the type of introspective reasoning associated with the eductive
approach. Indeed, we captured subjects’ decision time as a variable in order to
understand whether there are differences in decision time across treatments T1-T3,
or between individuals and groups in our monopoly and oligopoly treatments.
11
Based on the theoretical analysis of the last section, we formulate the following
testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The market price in all treatments converges to the rational expecta-
tion equilibrium.
As in section 2, both adaptive and eductive learning theories predict the market
price will converge to the REE in treatments 1 and 2. In treatment 3, the REE is
learnable under adaptive learning, but not under eductive learning. If Hypothesis 1
is rejected, and the market price does not converge to the REE in treatment 3, the
experimental result favors eductive learning over adaptive learning.
Hypothesis 2. Given that the market price converges to the REE, convergence takes
place in the first period of the experiment.
Since convergence under adaptive learning takes place more gradually and in real
time while eductive learning happens in notional time, the convergence should take
place in the first real period that is incentivized for monetary payment if agents are
eductive learners, or after a few periods if agents use adaptive learning. If Hypothesis
2 is rejected, the experimental result favors adaptive learning over eductive learning.
Hypothesis 3. There is no difference in the frequency or speed of convergence to
REE in the monopoly markets relative to the oligopoly markets.
Eductive learning requires common knowledge of rationality, which is not a con-
cern in the monopoly markets, but can be a concern in oligopoly markets involving 3
firms. If the market price converges in all monopoly markets but not in all oligopoly
markets, it suggests that agents may have difficultly achieving common knowledge of
rationality in the oligopoly setting. Otherwise, if Hypothesis 3 is rejected, it suggests
common knowledge of rationality may not be difficult to achieve, and that a group
setting can facilitate learning.
Hypothesis 4. Agents spend no more time in making their decisions in each period
of treatment 3 as compared with each period of treatments 1 or 2.
Since eductive learning can involve considerable introspective reasoning in notional
time, which we take to be the period prior to the first incentivized market forecasting
12
Treatment Monopoly Oligopoly Total No.
Conditions No. Markets /Subjects No. Markets / Subjects Subjects
T1 14 / 14 6 / 18 32
T2 12 / 12 6 / 18 30
T3 13 / 13 7 / 21 34
Totals 39 / 39 19 / 57 96
Table 1: Number of Markets (Independent Observations) and Subjects in the Six
Treatments of the Experiment
period, it may require more time for agents to reach a decision. In particular, the
REE is predicted to be impossible to learn under eductive learning in treatment 3 as
compared with treatments 1 and 2. Since decision time is a typical measure of the
cognitive cost to agents of making decisions, if Hypothesis 4 is rejected, it suggests
that making a decision in treatment 3 is indeed more difficult than in treatments 1
or 2.
4.2 Number of Observations
The experimental data was collected in a number of sessions run at the CREED Lab
of the University of Amsterdam. Subjects had no prior experience with our experi-
mental design and were not allowed to participate in more than a single session of our
experiment. Each session consisted of 50 periods over which the treatment parame-
ters for that session were held constant (i.e. we used a “between subjects” design).
Table 1 provides a summary of the number of subjects or markets (independent ob-
servations) for each of our six treatments. Note that in the monopoly treatment each
subject acted alone in a single market, so the number of subjects equals the number
of independent observations (markets) in that setting. By contrast, in the oligopoly
treatment, each market consisted of three firms (subjects), so while we have more
subjects in the oligopoly treatments we nevertheless have fewer 3-firm markets (in-
dependent observations) for the oligopoly treatments. Each session averaged about 1
hour and 10 minutes in duration. The average payoff was 21.70 euros across all three
monopoly treatments and 20.68 euros across all three oligopoly treatments.
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4.3 Computer Screen
Figure 3 shows the computer screen we developed for the experiment in the treatment
where α = −0.5. Subjects were asked to enter a forecast number in the box and then
to click “send” to submit their forecast in each period. Since the price and price
expectation were restricted to be non-negative, the range of possible prices should
be [0, 60] according to equation (1).7 However, restricting the price forecast range to
[0, 60] would be equivalent to directly imposing the first step in the eductive learning
process. Therefore, we restricted the price forecast range to [0, 100] in the experiment,
which is less suggestive and coincides with the range of the Y-axis in the graph of
historical information. Notice that the computer decision screen presented subjects
with information and graphs of past prices, their own prior predictions as well as
realizations of shocks. The screen was refreshed with updated information once all
subjects had submitted forecasts and the market price was determined. Notice further
that at the top of the decision screen, the price determination equation (1) with the
treatment specific value of α was always present to subjects just above the input box
where they were asked to submit their price prediction in each period.
Figure 3: The computer decision screen used in the experiment for the treatment
where α = −0.5 and the subject is a monopoly in the local market. Note: the price
and price expectations shown in this figure are random inputs by the authors for
illustration purposes, and are not taken from any experimental data.





Subjects earned points (experimental currency) during the experiment that were con-
verted into euros at the end of the experiment according to a known and fixed rate.
The payoff function for subjects (in points) is a decreasing quadratic function of their
prediction error, and was given by:








Notice that subjects earn 0 if their own, individual price forecast error is greater than
7, and they earn a maximum of 1300 for a perfect forecast. Subjects’ point totals
from all 50 periods were converted into to euros at the end of each session at a known
and fixed rate of 1 euro for every 2600 points. Thus, over 50 periods, each subject’s




Figure 4 plots the average market price against the respective REE price using data
from all markets of each of the three monopoly treatments. We observe that the
average market price in all three treatments appears to converges to the REE price,
although at different speeds (we will quantify this speed of convergence later in section
5.2). The adjustment towards REE is observed to be fastest in T1 and slowest in T3.
Figure 5 plots the disaggregated price path of each individual market for each of the
three monopoly treatments against the respective REE price. As this figure reveals,
it may take up to 25 periods for some markets to converge, e.g., in treatment T3, and
there are a lot of extreme outcomes, e.g., prices such as 0 and 60. From these results we
preliminarily conclude that adaptive learning is correct in predicting the convergence
outcome across all three treatments, however the time path of convergence for some
markets often resembles a real-time demonstration of the eductive learning process,
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in particular, the dampened cycling of prices over time in some markets. If we look
at self-reported strategies from a questionnaire solicited from subjects following the
end of the experiment (as we do later in section 5.6), it seems that several subjects
directly solved for the REE using p∗ = µ
1−α .
Table 2 reports the mean market price and the variance in market price across all
markets of each of the three monopoly treatments for the entire sample of 50 periods
as well as the first and last halves of the sample. Confirming the impression given
in Figures 4-5, we observe that, on average, market prices converged to the REE
prediction for each treatment and that the variance in market prices in treatment 1 is
the lowest at 4.62 over all 50 periods while the variance in market prices in treatment
3 is the greatest at 100.31 over all 50 periods.
Treatment REE Price Period 1-50 Period 1-25 Period 26-50
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
α = −0.5 p∗ = 40 40.09 4.62 39.98 8.29 40.19 1.01
α = −0.9 p∗ = 31.58 31.36 9.68 31.27 15.33 31.51 4.34
α = −2.0 p∗ = 20 20.14 100.31 20.11 202.25 20.17 1.40
Table 2: Mean price and variance of price in each treatment (α = −0.5,−0.9,−2) in
the monopoly setting.
5.1.2 Oligopoly Markets
Figure 6 plots the average market price against the respective REE price using data
from all markets of each of the three oligopoly treatments. We see that the average
price in all three treatments converges to the REE price, although, again, at different
speeds. The adjustment towards REE is again observed to be fastest in T1 and
slowest in T3.
Figure 7 plots the disaggregated market prices for each of the three-firm markets
(independent observations) against the respective REE price for all three oligopoly
treatments. Compared with the monopoly treatment, the convergence to REE ap-
pears to be faster and more reliable in the eductively stable treatments, namely
markets with α = −0.5 and α = −0.9. By contrast, in the eductively unstable





























Figure 4: The average market price against the REE price in each of the three treat-






















































Figure 5: Disaggregated market prices against the REE price when α = −0.5,−0.9
and −2 (from top to bottom) in the monopoly design.
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pears to be greater and more persistent as compared with monopoly T3 treatment.
Indeed, one oligopoly market (Market 4) in the T3 treatment fails to converge to the
REE within the 50 periods allowed (more on our convergence criterion below). This
finding may suggest that the oligopoly market setting facilitates learning when the
REE is eductively stable as this environment is more conducive to common knowledge
of rationality. While the REE is not eductively stable, although most markets still
converge, faced with the large uncertainty that other agents may not be able to learn
the REE, common knowledge of rationality is harder to achieve, and therefore the
oligopoly market setting makes convergence more difficult.
Table 3 reports the mean market price and the variance in market prices across
all markets of each of the three oligopoly treatments for the entire 50 period sample
and for th first and second halves of the experiment. Consistent with Figures 6-7,
we observe that, on average, market prices converged to the REE prediction for each
treatment and that the variance in market prices in treatment 1 is the lowest at 1.19
over all 50 periods while the variance in market prices in treatment 3 is the greatest
at 74.5 over all 50 periods.
Treatment REE Price Period 1-50 Period 1-25 Period 26-50
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
α = −0.5 p∗ = 40 40.15 1.19 40.09 1.43 40.22 0.00
α = −0.9 p∗ = 31.58 31.65 2.82 31.49 4.20 31.81 1.47
α = −2.0 p∗ = 20 19.67 74.51 19.54 119.91 19.80 31.83
Table 3: Mean price and variance of price in each treatment (α = −0.5,−0.9,−2) in
the oligopoly setting.
5.2 Convergence to REE
We shall declare that convergence to the REE occurs in the first period for which the
absolute difference between the market price and the REE price is less than 3 and
stays below 3 forever after that period. We choose a threshold 3 for two reasons: (1)
the standard deviation of νt is 1 so we need a threshold value that is large enough
to distinguish between deviations caused by random noise and deviations caused by
subjects’ choices; (2) the threshold should not be so large that it allows for systematic





























Figure 6: The average oligopoly market price against the REE price when α =












































Figure 7: Disaggregated oligopoly market prices against the REE price when α =
−0.5,−0.9 and −2 (from top to bottom) in the oligopoly design.
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rationalizable price range, [0, 60], and one-sided deviations from REE larger than 3
(5%) of this range may be regarded as substantial. We further categorize the markets
according to whether convergence happens in the first period, between periods 2 and
5, between periods 6 and 10, between periods 11 and 20, between period 21 and 50,
and those markets that never satisfied our convergence criterion. The results from
applying our convergence criterion to each market of each treatment are reported in
Table 4. In the final rows of the same table we also report the mean number of periods
required for convergence (according to our criterion) in each treatment as well as the
variance.
On average, it takes fewer periods for the market price to converge to the REE
in treatment T1 as compared with treatments T2 and T3 in both the monopoly and
oligopoly settings. Somewhat surprisingly, in the monopoly market treatment, the
average number of periods before convergence obtains is slightly larger in treatment
T2 than in treatment T3. However, it turns out that this finding is due to just three
subjects in treatment T2 who inexplicably began to experiment with very high/low
numbers after they had converged to the REE for more than 10 periods. For the
oligopoly treatment, the mean number of periods to convergence is increasing with
the absolute value of α. A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test on market-level data suggests
that the differences in the mean time to convergence between treatments 1 and each
of the other two treatments is significant at the 5% level for both the monopoly and
oligopoly markets, while the differences in the mean time to convergence between
treatments 2 and 3 are not significant at the 5% level for both the monopoly or
oligopoly markets. For both the monopoly and oligopoly markets, the variance in the
number of periods before convergence is smallest in treatment 1. In the monopoly
market treatment, the variance in the number of periods required for convergence is
larger in treatment 2 than in treatment 3, which is again due to the random behavior
of a few subjects. For the oligopoly treatment the variance in the number of periods
required for convergence is again increasing with the absolute value of α. If we were
to ignore the random behavior by the three subjects in monopoly treatment T2, our
results would generally support the notion that convergence is more difficult as the
absolute value of the coefficient α becomes larger, as larger values of α make the
market more unstable.
Table 4 also reveals that for treatments T1 and T2 of both the monopoly and
oligopoly settings, there is at least 1 market (and often more) that converges to the
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REE beginning with the very first period. The fact that a market converges to the
REE in the very first period may be regarded as support for the eductive learning
approach. If this eductive learning criteria is relaxed to allow for convergence within
the first 5 periods then about 70% of the markets in treatments T1 and T2 of our
experiment can be said to be consistent with eductive learning. By contrast, in
treatment T3 of the monopoly treatment, 5 of 13 (38.5 percent) of markets take more
than 20 periods to satisfy the convergence criterion, the largest frequency of such late
convergence observed across all of our treatments. In treatment T3 of the oligopoly
treatment, there are no instances of convergence to the REE in the very first period of
a session and one market in this treatment failed to satisfy our convergence criterion
within the 50 periods allowed by our experiment. These differences in outcomes
between the eductively stable treatments T1 and T2 and the eductively unstable
treatment T3 suggest that the eductive stability criterion is useful in understanding
differences in the behavior of subjects in our experiment.
Convergence Monopoly Oligopoly
in period(s) α = −0.5 α = −0.9 α = −2 α = −0.5 α = −0.9 α = −2
1 42.9% (6) 16.7% (2) 15.4% (2) 83.3% (5) 16.7%(1) 0.0% (0)
[2, 5] 42.9% (6) 50.0% (6) 15.4% (2) 16.7% (1) 50.0%(3) 14.3% (1)
[6, 10] 7.1% (1) 8.3% (1) 15.4% (2) 0.0% (0) 16.7%(1) 42.9% (3)
[11, 20] 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 15.4% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0%(0) 14.3% (1)
[21, 50] 7.1% (1) 25.0% (3) 38.5% (5) 0.0% (0) 16.7%(1) 14.3% (1)
Never 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0%(0) 14.3% (1)
Total 100.0% (14) 100.0% (12) 100.0% (13) 100.0% (6) 100.0%(6) 100.0% (7)
Average 3.6 10.9 10.0 1.2 10.0 20.0
Variance 31.6 226.8 90.5 0.2 315.6 427.7
Table 4: Frequency distribution of the number of periods it takes for convergence to
REE in each treatment.
Figure 8 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the num-
ber of periods before convergence obtains using data from all markets of each treat-
ment. For the oligopoly markets, it is clear that treatment 3 takes the greater number
of periods while treatment 1 requires the fewest periods. For the monopoly markets,
although the CDF of treatment 3 starts below the other two treatments, it crosses
treatment 2 due to the very high/low numbers submitted by those few subjects in
treatment 2 after prices had converged to the REE for some time.






























# Periods before Convergence, Oligopoly
Figure 8: The empirical cdf of the number of periods before convergence in different
treatment. The horizontal axis measures the number of periods.
Result 1. We (partly) reject Hypothesis 1 as convergence to the REE obtains in
all three treatments but it is not very robust in treatment 3 where α = −2. This
finding suggests, as Evans (2001) observes, that the learning process may be a mixture
of adaptive and eductive approaches when the REE is not learnable under eductive
learning.
Result 2. We (partly) reject Hypothesis 2, when the REE is learnable under eductive
learning, convergence can occur immediately but often requires more than a single
period. This finding again suggests that the learning path across all agents may be a
mixture of real time and notional time learning.
Result 3. We reject Hypothesis 3, in treatment 3, all monopoly markets converge to
the REE in the end, while one oligopoly market fails to converge at all. This finding
suggests that it is indeed not easy to achieve common knowledge of rationality when
the REE is not learnable under eductive learning.
5.3 Fit of the Two Learning Models to the Experimental
Data
We next consider the fit of the two different approaches to learning to our experimental
data. Table 5 reports on the mean squared error between the experimental data and
market prices simulated according to the two different learning models in all six
treatments.
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For the adaptive learning model, we assume that the model’s predictions coincide
with the actual (average) price prediction in the experimental data. To initialize a
simulation of the adaptive learning model we set the initial price prediction pe1 equal
to the individual (monopoly) or average (oligopoly) predictions made by subjects in
period 1 (and period 1 only). Thereafter, the adaptive learning model specifies how
all subsequent simulated prices and predictions are determined. That is, given pe1, the
price for period 1, p1, is determined by equation (1). Given p1 the adaptive learning
model predicts the price for period 2 according to equation (3), and thus generates a
simulated actual price for period 2 again via equation (1). In period 3, the adaptive
model take the average of the simulated prices for periods 1 and 2 and make a price
prediction for period 3, which is then used to generate the simulated price for period
3 via equation (1), etc. Thus, to sum up, the model uses its own simulated prices
as input to generate simulated market price predictions in each period. Therefore
the simulation only loads the experimental data from period 1, and makes simulated
prices and predictions for the remaining 49 periods, so there is no degrees of freedom
in the predictions of the adaptive learning model for each market observation.
For the eductive learning model, we just assume that in each period, both the
simulated price prediction and the actual market price equal the REE price, µ
1−α .
Therefore there is again no degrees of freedom in the predictions of the eductive
learning model.
The mean squared errors (MSE) between the simulated data and experimental
data as presented in Table 5, suggest that in general, the fit of the adaptive learning
model to the experimental data results in a smaller MSE than does the eductive
learning model; the mean MSE for the adaptive learning model is lower than for
eductive learning model in 5 of our 6 treatments. A Wilcoxon signed rank test suggests
that the difference between the MSE by adaptive and eductive learning models is
significant at 5% level for α = −0.5 with both monopoly and oligopoly settings (in
both cases the adaptive learning model generates smaller MSE on average), and not
significant in other treatments. However, there is also some heterogeneity across the
different markets/observations. For example, for the oligopoly market with α = −0.9,
the adaptive learning model generates a lower MSE relative to the eductive learning
model in markets 1, 2 and 5, but a higher MSE relative to the eductive learning
model in markets 3, 4 and 6. This finding suggests that it is very likely that some
oligopoly markets are dominated by subjects using adaptive learning, while others
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are dominated by subjects using eductive learning. We will provide evidence for such
heterogeneity of types later in section 5.6.
5.4 Payoff Efficiency
Table 5.4 shows the average payoffs and payoff efficiency (payoffs divided by 25 euros,
which was the maximum amount each subject could earn when they made no fore-
casting errors) for each treatment. Payoff efficiency is about 90% when α = −0.5 and
α = −0.9, and a little lower, between 70%-80% when α = −2. Efficiency is higher
in the oligopoly treatment than in the monopoly treatment when the REE is educ-
tively stable (T1 and T2), and lower in the oligopoly treatment than in the monopoly
treatment when the REE is eductively unstable (T3). We performed a Wilcoxon
Mann-Whitney Test using individual earnings data (the number of observations is
the number of subjects in each treatment, which is equal to the number of markets in
the monopoly design). The results indicate that for the monopoly treatment, there
is no difference in payoff efficiency between the α = −0.5 and α = −0.9treatments
at the 5% level, but that payoff efficiency in the α = −0.5 or α = −0.9 treatments is
significantly greater than payoff efficiency in the α = −2 treatment at the 5% level,
suggesting that eductive stability matters for payoff efficiency. In the oligopoly treat-
ment, the average payoff is highest in treatment T1, and lowest in treatment T3. The
differences in payoff efficiency for each pairwise comparison of the three treatments
with different α’s are all significant at the 5% level where the number of observations
is equal to the number subjects in each treatment. If, in the oligopoly treatment, we
instead consider market-level payoff efficiency, then the difference between treatments
T1 and T2 becomes statistically insignificant, however the payoff efficiency in those
two treatments remains significantly greater than in treatment T3 at the 5% level.
5.5 Decision Time
We collected data on the time it took subjects to make their decisions. Specifically, in
each period we measured the time, in seconds, from the start of each new period to the
time at which each subject clicked “send” to submit their price forecast for that same
period. Such data can be useful in understanding possible variation in the cognitive
difficulty of decision-making tasks. In particular, Rubinstein (2007) provides evidence
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Learning Monopoly Oligopoly
Model Market α = −0.5 α = −0.9 α = −2 α = −0.5 α = −0.9 α = −2
Adaptive 1 0.23 0.12 349.25 0.02 1.97 40.04
2 0.08 0.31 152.50 0.04 0.43 4.83
3 0.04 19.00 0.35 0.09 0.56 27.91
4 27.43 0.05 3.71 0.06 8.38 131.71
5 0.24 4.17 16.79 0.03 0.98 209.53
6 0.04 4.37 0.51 0.03 1.56 21.58
7 5.94 7.07 3.54 51.47
8 0.02 0.57 245.09
9 0.20 0.14 31.08
10 0.08 3.19 1.77
11 0.12 7.83 373.21
12 0.37 1.16 3.82
13 0.01 2.48
14 2.36
average 2.66 4.00 91.08 0.05 2.31 69.58
Eductive 1 0.63 0.00 356.76 0.22 1.95 69.58
2 0.23 0.07 105.85 0.26 0.51 59.00
3 0.54 42.24 46.42 0.17 0.34 12.10
4 35.29 0.05 4.08 0.51 5.14 7.49
5 0.82 24.42 28.23 0.05 1.31 170.19
6 0.51 4.66 0.00 0.17 1.05 212.95
7 5.51 18.98 33.53 37.14
8 0.05 0.56 258.49
9 0.76 1.37 10.81
10 1.18 4.48 0.71
11 1.16 9.11 387.83
12 1.64 2.22 4.00
13 1.97 2.05
14 4.35
average 3.90 9.01 95.29 0.23 1.72 81.21
Table 5: MSE between the experimental data and the two learning model predictions.
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Market Structure α Payoff Efficiency
Monopoly −0.5 22.9 91.6%
−0.9 22.7 90.8%
−2 20.1 80.4%
Oligopoly −0.5 23.8 95.2%
−0.9 22.8 91.2%
−2 16.5 66.0%
Table 6: Payoffs and payoff efficiency across the six treatments.
that choices requiring greater cognitive activity are positively correlated with longer
decision response time. In our experiment, subjects face a more difficult task in T3
as compared with either T1 and T2 and so they may be expected to take more time
to make their decisions in treatment 3 than in treatments 1 or 2.
Figure 9 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of decision time for
treatments T1, T2 and T3. We find that for the monopoly treatment, the average
decision time is 17.0 seconds in T1, 15.5 seconds in T2 and 17.9 seconds in T3. The
difference between T2 and each of the other two treatments is significant at the 5%
level according to the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test, while the difference between T1
and T3 is not significant.
In the oligopoly treatment, the results are more in line with our expectations.
The average decision time in T1 is 19.2 seconds, the average decision time in T2
is 19.0 seconds and the average decision time in T3 is considerably larger at 29.2
seconds. This finding supports the notion that subjects face a more difficult task in
treatment 3, and therefore require more time. Note further that mean decision time
in each of the three oligopoly treatments is greater than the mean decision time in
the corresponding monopoly version of those three treatments. A Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test shows that difference between the oligopoly and monopoly design is
significant at 5% level for T2 and T3, but not for T1. This result suggests the subjects
on general face a more difficult task in the oligopoly design compared to the monopoly
design.
The findings in this section are summarized by Result 4.































Empirical CDF of Decision Time Oligopoly
Figure 9: The empirical cdf of the time taken to complete decision tasks in T1-T3 of
the monopoly (left panel) and oligopoly (right panel) treatments. The unit of time is
seconds, as measured on the horizontal axis.
treatment. The cognitive cost of making decisions in treatment 3 is not a lot larger
than in the other two treatments if subjects do not have to consider problem of coordi-
nation and common knowledge of rationality. By contrast, when common knowledge
of rationality is an issue as in our oligopoly treatment, decision time is significantly
greater in treatment 3 relative to the other two treatments.
5.6 Categorization of Subjects into Adaptive or Eductive
Learners
Finally, we try to categorize each subject in our experiment into one of three types:
adaptive learner, eductive learner or neither. We do this using two different ap-
proaches and we compare the results from using each approach.
The first approach is to make categorizations based on the definition of the two
types of learning. This categorization is performed as follows:
1. We consider all subjects who predict the REE in the very first period to be
eductive learners. Since the REE in treatment T2 where α = −0.9 is 31.58,
and not an integer, taking into account that some subjects may use α = −1 as
a proxy, we consider all subjects making predictions in the range [30, 32] to be
eductive learners in T2. For the other two treatments, the REE is an integer
value so to be categorized as an eductive learner, subjects must correctly predict
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a price of 40 in T1 and 20 in T3.
2. For each subject we use their first period forecast to initialize the adaptive
learning model as given in equation (3) and we then calculate the mean squared
error between the simulated predictions of that model and each individual sub-
ject’s actual price predictions.8 If the mean squared error between actual and
predicted price forecasts is smaller than 1, then the subject is classified as an
adaptive learner. We choose a threshold of 1 as we wanted the threshold to be
as low as possible, but at the same time allow for subjects to engage in some
rounding of numbers to integer values. Since adaptive learning does not make
assumptions on the initial price prediction, the probability that one happens
to come up with the REE is infinitely close to 0 under adaptive learning. If
a subject meets our criteria for being categorized as both an adaptive and an
eductive learner, then we classify him/her as an eductive learner. If a subject
meets neither criteria, then he/she is classified as “neither”.
The second approach to type classification makes use of answers that subjects
gave to a post–experimental questionnaire (see the Appendix for details). The ques-
tionnaire asked subjects a number of restricted-form questions about the type of
prediction strategy they used during the experiment. We provided them with four
options, and we asked them to choose the option that best described how they made
their predictions in the experiment. Specifically, the four options were:
1. I refer to information about past prices.
2. I make calculations based on the value of α.
3. I eliminate unlikely numbers iteratively.
4. None of the above.
A subject is classified as an adaptive learner if he chooses option 1, and is classified
as an eductive learner if he chooses option 3. If the subject chooses option 2, it is
8Note that the MSE in Table (5) compares the simulated and experimental market prices. There-
fore, from equation 1, we know the MSE on price expectations equals the MSE market price times
α.
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likely that he solves the REE directly, and we also classify this type as a an eductive
learner. Subjects choosing option 4 are classified as “neither”. Due to a technical
problem, we lost some data on self-reported strategies in the first, and relatively larger
session of our monopoly market treatments, (9 markets for treatment 1, 8 markets for
each of treatments 2 and 3). Nevertheless, we do have data on self-reported strategies
for many of our subjects and for all six treatments.
Table 9 and 10 in the Appendix show each subject’s type using both approaches
(where possible). Table 5.6 shows the number of participants who can be categorized
as adaptive or eductive learners in each treatment. In general, it seems that more
subjects can be categorized as adaptive and/or eductive learners when α = −0.5 than
when α = −0.9 or −2. There are more subjects who can be categorized as adaptive
learners than as eductive learners (there are in total 30 adaptive learners and 22
eductive learners according to approach 1, and 38 adaptive learners and 25 eductive
learners according to approach 2). In particular, there is a good level of consistency
between the categorizations based on our two different approaches. For 31 subjects
for which both approaches yield a classification of either adaptive or eductive learners,
the two approaches agree on the type assignment in 21 cases, which means the two
approaches assign the same category with a probability of 21/31 = 67.7%.
Theoretically, eductive learning could take a lot of time in period 1, as subjects
engage in the iterative eductive learning process to arrive at a price prediction while
adaptive learning should take relatively less time, as subjects are imagined to begin
their learning process by making a random guess. To explore this issue further, we
ran a simple linear regression exploring whether the different prediction strategies
were associated with different amounts of time in making period 1 decisions.9 For
simplicity, we use adp, edc to denote dummy variables for the adaptive or eductive
learners, respectively. The regression specification takes the form,
timei = constanti + β1adpi + β2edci + γ1Dα=−0.9,i + γ2Dα=−2,i, (5)
where timei denotes first period decision time and where we have also included dummy
variables for two of the three treatments conditions, α = −0.9 and α = −2 to control
for possible treatment effects. It turns out that neither of the β coefficients associated




Treatment α = −0.5 α = −0.9 α = −2
Monopoly
Adaptive 8 57.14% 2 16.67% 2 15.38%
Eductive 3 21.43% 5 41.67% 3 23.08%
Neither 3 21.43% 5 41.67% 8 61.54%
Total 14 100.00% 12 100.00% 13 100.00%
Oligopoly
Adaptive 12 66.67% 6 33.33% 0 0.00%
Eductive 4 22.22% 3 16.67% 4 19.05%
Neither 2 11.11% 9 50.00% 17 80.95%
Total 18 100.00% 18 100.00% 21 100.00%
Approach 2
Treatment α = −0.5 α = −0.9 α = −2
Monopoly
Adaptive 1 7.14% 1 8.33% 2 15.38%
Eductive 3 21.43% 2 16.67% 3 23.08%
Neither 10 71.43% 9 75.00% 8 61.54%
Total 14 100.00% 12 100.00% 13 100.00%
Oligopoly
Adaptive 11 61.11% 15 83.33% 8 38.10%
Eductive 7 38.89% 2 11.11% 8 38.10%
Neither 0 0.00% 1 5.56% 5 23.81%
Total 18 100.00% 18 100.00% 21 100.00%
Table 7: Number and percentage of subjects who can be categorized as adaptive or
eductive learners or neither in each treatment. Approach 1 is the approach based
on first period predictions and the mean squared error of individual price predictions
from the adaptive learning model. Approach 2 is the approach based on self-reported
strategies.
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with the adaptive or eductive learner dummy variables is significantly different from
zero at the 5% level, irrespective of whether we use the first or the second approach
to categorize our subjects. Hence, we do not find support for the notion that eductive
learners take more time in the first period than do other types of agents.
6 Conclusion
The process by which agents might learn a REE has been the subject of much theo-
retical work, but surprisingly there has been little empirical assessment of the leading
theories of this learning process. To address this gap, we have conducted a learning–
to–forecast experiment in the context of a simple cobweb economy with negative
feedback where expectations matter and where subjects are informed about the law
of motion for prices. We are particularly interested in knowing which approach, adap-
tive learning or eductive learning provides the better description of human learning
behavior in this setting. In particular, we vary the slope parameter of the price de-
termination equation, α, in such a way that in one of our treatments the REE should
not be learnable (stable under learning) if agents are eductive learners but should
always be learnable if agents are adaptive learners. Furthermore, our experimental
design includes both monopoly and oligopoly settings in order to better understand
the role played by common knowledge of rationality.
In all of our treatments, even the eductively unstable cases, we observe convergence
of prices to the REE, which provides evidence in support of adaptive learning and
against the eductive learning approach. However, the variance in market prices is
much greater in the eductively unstable treatments where α = −2 relative to the
other two eductively stable treatments where |α| < 1. Convergence to REE is also
slower in the eductively unstable case, especially in the oligopoly treatment where
prices often continue to deviate from the REE until the very end of the 50 period
horizon. Further, there are many instances of markets that satisfy our criteria for
convergence to the REE in the very first period, which is more in line with eductive
rather than adaptive learning. Indeed, our efforts to classify subjects as adaptive or
eductive learners reveals a mix of both learning types (as well as many subjects who
are unclassifiable). Perhaps, as Evans (2001) suggests, individuals use a mixture of
both adaptive and eductive learning approaches.
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The cobweb economy that we study is a very simple economic model. Our exper-
imental examination of forecasting behavior in this model is the first study in which
subjects were given complete information about the economic model. In this sense,
our experiment provides the most favorable conditions for the rational expectation
hypothesis and for the eductive learning approach to work. Our findings confirm that
the rational expectation hypothesis and rational expectation equilibrium provide a
good characterization of the market outcome in this setting. Further experimen-
tal studies might be conducted where subjects are exposed to a more complicated,
forward-looking dynamic economic model where forecasts matter for realizations of
future state variables, as for example in a modern dynamic, stochastic general equi-
librium model. We leave that extension to future research.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 Experimental Instructions (Monopoly)
Experimental Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in economic decision-making. Please read these in-
structions carefully as they explain how you earn money from the decisions you make
in today’s experiment. There is no talking for the duration of this session. If you have
a question at any time, please raise your hand and your question will be answered in
private.
General information
Imagine you are an advisor to a farm that is the only supplier of a product in a
local market. In each time period the owner of the farm needs to decide how many
units of the product he will produce. To make an optimal decision each period, the
owner requires a good prediction of the market price of the product in each period.
As the advisor to the farm owner, you will be asked to predict the market price, pt
of the product during 50 successive time periods, t=1,2,,50. Your earnings from this
experiment will depend on the accuracy of your price predictions alone. The smaller
are your prediction errors, the greater will be your earnings.
About the determination of the market price pt
The actual market price for the product in each time period, t, is determined by a
market clearing condition, meaning that it will be the price such that demand equals
supply for that period.
The amount demanded for the product depends on the market price for the prod-
uct. When the market price goes up (down) the demand will go down (up). The
supply of the product on the market is determined by the production decision of the
farm owner. Usually, a higher (lower) price prediction by you causes the farm owner
to produce a larger (smaller) quantity of the product which increases (decreases) the
supply of the product on the market. Therefore, the actual market price pt in each
period depends upon your prediction, pet , of the product’s market price. More pre-
cisely, equating demand and supply, we have that the market price of the product is
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determined according to:
pt = max(60− αpet + ηt, 0)
This means that the price cannot be below 0. The parameter α is different for different
local markets. You will see the α value for your own local market on your decision page
during the experiment. This α parameter will remain the same for your local market
for all 50 periods of the experiment. ηt is a small random shock to the supply caused
by non-market (demand/supply) factors, for example, weather conditions. This small
shock is randomly drawn each period and is sometimes positive, sometimes negative
and sometimes zero. It is not correlated across periods. This small shock is normally
distributed. The long term mean value of this small shock is 0, and the standard
deviation is 1.
Here is an example: Suppose the parameter α is 0.8 in your local market. Suppose
further that you price prediction for the period is 35, and the realization of the shock
ηt is -0.2. Using the equation given above, the market price is then determined as:
pt = 60− 0.8 ∗ 35− 0.2 = 31.8
Note that in this case your forecast error, |pet − pt|, is 35-31.8=3.2. This forecast
error of 3.2 would determine your points for the period as discussed below.
Please also note that this example is for illustration purposes only. The value of
the parameter α in your local market may be different from 0.8. The precise value of
alpha and the equation for the determination of the market price in your local market
is given on your decision page.
About your task
Your only task in this experiment is to correctly predict the market price in each
time period as accurately as possible. The only constraint on your predicted price is
that it cannot be less than zero (negative), since the actual price itself can never be less
than zero. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for
the price of your farm’s product in period 1. Note that, while there are several farms
being advised by a forecaster like you in each period, these different local markets
are totally separate from your own so what happens in other markets does not have
any influence on your market. After all forecasters have submitted their predictions
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for the first period, the local market price for period 1 will be determined and will
be revealed to you. Based the accuracy of your prediction in period 1, your earnings
will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period
2. When all forecasters have submitted their predictions for the second period, the
market price for that period in your local market will be revealed to you and your
earnings will be calculated, and so on, for all 50 consecutive periods.
Information
Following the first period, you will see information on your computer screen that
consists of 1) a plot of all past prices together with your market predictions and 2)
a table containing the history of your past forecasts and payoffs, as well as realized
market price and the shock term ηt.
About your payoff
Your payoff depends on the accuracy of your price forecast. The earnings shown
on the computer screen will be in terms of points. When your prediction is pet and
the market price is pt your payoff is a decreasing function in your prediction error,
namely the distance between your forecast and the realized price.
Payofft = max[1300− 1300
49
(pet − pt)2, 0]
Recalling the example above, if your forecast error for the period t, |pet − pt|,
was 3.2, then according to the payoff function you would earn 1028.33 points for the
period.
Notice that the maximum possible payoff in points you can earn from the fore-
casting task is 1300 for each period, and the larger is your prediction error, |pet − pt|,
the fewer points you earn. You will earn 0 points if your prediction error is larger
than 7. There is a Payoff Table on your desk, which shows the points you can earn
for various different prediction errors.
At the end of the experiment your total points earned from all 50 periods will be
converted into Euros at the rate of 1 Euro for every 2600 points that you earned.
Thus, the more points you earn, the greater are your Euro earnings.
Questions?
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If you have questions about any part of these instructions at any time, please raise
your hand and an experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private.
A.2 Experimental Instructions (Oligopoly)
Welcome to this experiment in economic decision-making. Please read these instruc-
tions carefully as they explain how you earn money from the decisions you make in
today’s experiment. There is no talking for the duration of this session. If you have
a question at any time, please raise your hand and your question will be answered in
private.
General information
Imagine you are an advisor to a farm that is one of the three main suppliers of a
product in a local market. In each time period the owner of the farm needs to decide
how many units of the product he will produce. To make an optimal decision, the
owner requires a good prediction of the market price of the product in each period.
As the advisor to the farm owner, you will be asked to predict the local market price,
pt of the product during 50 successive time periods, t = 1, 2, 3, ...50. Your earnings
from this experiment will depend on the accuracy of your price predictions alone.
The smaller are your prediction errors, the greater will be your earnings.
About the determination of the market price pt
The actual market price for the product in each time period,t, is determined by a
market clearing condition, meaning that it will be the price such that demand equals
supply for that period.
The amount demanded for the product depends on the market price for the prod-
uct. When the market price goes up (down) the demand will go down (up). The
supply of the product on the market is determined by the production decision of the
farm owners. Usually, a higher (lower) price prediction by the advisors causes the
farm owners to produce a larger (smaller) quantity of the product which increases
(decreases) the supply of the product on the market. Therefore the actual market
price pt in each period depends upon the average prediction, p
e
t of the product’s mar-












3,t). Equating demand and supply, we have that the
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market price of the product is determined according to:
P (t) = 60− αpet + ηt
This means that the price cannot be below 0. The parameter α will be shown
on your decision page during the experiment. This α parameter will be the same for
all three farms in your local market and for all 50 periods. Note also that ηt is a
small random shock to the supply caused by non-market (demand/supply) factors,
for example, weather conditions. This small shock is randomly drawn each period and
is sometimes positive, sometimes negative and sometimes zero. It is not correlated
across periods. This small shock is normally distributed. The long term mean value
of this small shock is 0, and the standard deviation is 1.
Here is an example: Suppose the parameter α is 0.8 for all three farms in your
market. Suppose further that you prediction for the price is 30 and the predictions
by the other two advisors in your market are 35 and 40 respectively. Finally, suppose
that the realization of the shock, η, is -0.2. The market price is in your three farm
local market is then determined as follows:
pt = 60− 0.8× 1
3
(30 + 35 + 40)− 0.2 = 31.8
Note that in this case your forecast error (the distance between your forecast and
the market price), |pet − pt|, is |30− 31.8| = 1.8. This forecast error would be used to
determine your points for the period as discussed below.
Please also note that this example is for illustration purposes only. The value of
the parameter may be different from 0.8. The precise value of α and the equation for
the determination of the market price in your local market are given on your decision
page.
About your task
Your only task in this experiment is to correctly predict the market price in each
time period as accurately as possible. The only constraint on your predicted price is
that it cannot be less than zero (negative), since the actual price itself can never be
less than zero. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction
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for the price in period 1. There are several markets of various products and each
of them consists of 3 farms, and each of the farms is advised by a forecaster like
you. These different local markets are totally separate from your own market so
what happens in other markets does not have any influence on your market. After all
forecasters have submitted their predictions for the first period, the local market price
for period 1 will be determined and will be revealed to you. Based on the accuracy
of your prediction in period 1, your earnings will be calculated. Subsequently, you
are asked to enter your prediction for period 2. When all forecasters have submitted
their predictions for the second period, the market price for that period in your local
market will be revealed to you and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for
all 50 consecutive periods.
Information
Following the first period, you will see information on your computer screen that
consists of 1) a plot of all past market prices together with your market price forecasts
and 2) a table containing the history of your past forecasts and payoffs, as well as
realized market prices and the shock term, ηt.
About your payoff
Your payoff depends on the accuracy of your price forecast. The earnings shown
on the computer screen will be in terms of points. When your prediction is and the
market price is your payoff is a decreasing function of your prediction error, namely
the distance between your forecast and the realized price. Specifically:





Notice that the maximum possible payoff in points you can earn from the fore-
casting task is 1300 for each period, and the larger is your prediction error, the fewer
points you earn. You will earn 0 points if your prediction error is larger than 7.
There is a Payoff Table on your desk, which shows the points you can earn for various
different prediction errors.
At the end of the experiment your total points earned from all 50 periods will
be converted into Euros at the rate of 1 Euro for every 2600 points that you earned.
Thus, the more points you earn, the greater are your Euro earnings.
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Questions?
If you have questions about any part of these instructions at any time, please raise
your hand and an experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private.
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B Payoff Table
Table 8 is the payoff table used in this experiment.
Payoff Table for Forecasting Task
Your Payoff=max[1300− 1300
49
(Your Prediction Error)2, 0]
2600 points equal 1 euro
error points error points error points error points
0 1300 1.85 1209 3.7 937 5.55 483
0.05 1300 1.9 1204 3.75 927 5.6 468
0.1 1300 1.95 1199 3.8 917 5.65 453
0.15 1299 2 1194 3.85 907 5.7 438
0.2 1299 2.05 1189 3.9 896 5.75 423
0.25 1298 2.1 1183 3.95 886 5.8 408
0.3 1298 2.15 1177 4 876 5.85 392
0.35 1297 2.2 1172 4.05 865 5.9 376
0.4 1296 2.25 1166 4.1 854 5.95 361
0.45 1295 2.3 1160 4.15 843 6 345
0.5 1293 2.35 1153 4.2 832 6.05 329
0.55 1292 2.4 1147 4.25 821 6.1 313
0.6 1290 2.45 1141 4.3 809 6.15 297
0.65 1289 2.5 1134 4.35 798 6.2 280
0.7 1287 2.55 1127 4.4 786 6.25 264
0.75 1285 2.6 1121 4.45 775 6.3 247
0.8 1283 2.65 1114 4.5 763 6.35 230
0.85 1281 2.7 1107 4.55 751 6.4 213
0.9 1279 2.75 1099 4.6 739 6.45 196
0.95 1276 2.8 1092 4.65 726 6.5 179
1 1273 2.85 1085 4.7 714 6.55 162
1.05 1271 2.9 1077 4.75 701 6.6 144
1.1 1268 2.95 1069 4.8 689 6.65 127
1.15 1265 3 1061 4.85 676 6.7 109
1.2 1262 3.05 1053 4.9 663 6.75 91
1.25 1259 3.1 1045 4.95 650 6.8 73
1.3 1255 3.15 1037 5 637 6.85 55
1.35 1252 3.2 1028 5.05 623 6.9 37
1.4 1248 3.25 1020 5.1 610 6.95 19
1.45 1244 3.3 1011 5.15 596 error ≥ 0
1.5 1240 3.35 1002 5.2 583
1.55 1236 3.4 993 5.25 569
1.6 1232 3.45 984 5.3 555
1.65 1228 3.5 975 5.35 541
1.7 1223 3.55 966 5.4 526
1.75 1219 3.6 956 5.45 512
1.8 1214 3.65 947 5.5 497
Table 8: Payoff Table for Forecasters
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C Categorization of Subjects
α = −0.5 Categorized Reported α = −0.9 Categorized Reported α = −2 Categorized Reported
exp1 A exp1 E exp1
exp2 A exp2 A exp2
exp3 A exp3 exp3 A
exp4 exp4 E exp4 E
exp5 A exp5 exp5
exp6 A exp6 exp6 E
exp7 exp7 exp7
exp8 E exp8 A exp8
exp9 A exp9 E E exp9 A
exp10 E E exp10 E E exp10 A
exp11 E exp11 E exp11 E
exp12 A A exp12 A exp12 E
exp13 A E exp13 E E
exp14 E
Table 9: Categorization of subjects into adaptive and eductive learners in the
monopoly setting. “A” means adaptive learner. “E” means eductive learner. We
leave the cell blank for subjects we can not categorize into either of the two types.
“Categorized” means categorization according to the first approach where we use the
definition of the learning rules. “Reported” means categorization is done according
to the second approach based on self-reported strategies.
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α = −0.5 Categorized Reported α = −0.9 Categorized Reported α = −2 Categorized Reported
exp11 E E exp11 E exp11
exp12 A A exp12 A exp12 E
exp13 A A exp13 A exp13 E
exp21 A E exp21 A A exp21 E
exp22 E E exp22 A A exp22 E
exp23 A A exp23 A A exp23 A
exp31 A E exp31 A A exp31 A
exp32 A A exp32 E A exp32 E E
exp33 A exp33 A exp33 A
exp41 A A exp41 A exp41 E E
exp42 A exp42 A exp42 A
exp43 A E exp43 A exp43 E
exp51 E E exp51 A A exp51 A
exp52 A A exp52 A exp52 E A
exp53 A A exp53 E E exp53
exp61 E A exp61 A exp63 E
exp62 A A exp62 A exp64 E




Table 10: Categorization of subjects into adaptive and eductive learners in the
oligopoly setting. “A” means adaptive learner. “E” means eductive learner. We
leave the cell blank for subjects we can not categorize into either of the two types.
“Categorized” means categorization according to the first approach where we use the
definition of the learning rules. “Reported” means categorization is done according
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